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However, most of the studies have focused on the total competitive 
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the internal dynamics behind the changes experienced. Our results show a 
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although the dynamics behind the increases in inequality are different in 
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Football is a simple game. Twenty-two men chase a ball 
for 90 minutes and at the end, the Germans always win. 
 
Gary Lineker 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
According to part of the literature on sports economics, there is no worse enemy for the 
future of a sport than the lack of competition. In his 1964 seminal work, Neale presented 
the extreme case of a heavyweight boxer in his Louis-Schmelling Paradox. The argument 
was simple: In a sport in which income is derived and is an increasing function of 
competition, in the absence of strong adversaries that could face him, Joe Louis would 
have no fights and therefore no income (Neale, 1964: 2). Following Neal, Schmidt and 
Berry (2001), showed a connection between the level of competition in a Major Baseball 
League and attendance, and highlighted the importance of a fair balance between the teams 
in competition to guarantee its success. More recently and focusing on football, Forrest and 
Simmons (2002) and Dobson and Goddard (2011) suggested that an increase in 
competitive balance in the sport would boost attendance and television audience. 
 
Following the economic consequences of competitive balance, El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) 
argued that the maximization of success in a competition could compromise increasing 
profits. For them, the uncertainty of the result is one of the most important factors that 
explains the high interest of the general public in some sport competitions. A competition 
in which the outcome can be easily predicted will, over the long term, result in a reduction 
in the interest of the public, which could produce an economic downfall.  Similarly, 
Vrooman (1995) Hausman and Leonard (1997) and Késenne (2000) followed the steps of 
El-Hodiri and Quirk in the development of the models to study competitive balance. 
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On these grounds, football should therefore be grateful to see that Gary Lineker’s comment 
concerning the domination of Germany (or any other team) on the international 
battleground did not materialize, or at least, last for very long. However, the increasing 
economic inequalities between football teams within the major European leagues has 
raised concerns with respect to their impact on competitive balance. In any case, the 
connection between revenue sharing and competitive balance needs to be clarified. While 
Szymanski (2001) showed that increasing economic inequality in the Premier League did 
not increase inequality within the competition, Késenne (2000) showed that revenue 
sharing would have a positive impact on competitive balance only if the most powerful 
clubs are focused on profit maximization. In more recent years, the  effects of different 
methods of revenue sharing on competitive balance have been widely studied by the 
literature with the works of  Szymanski (2003), Budzinski (2012), Müller, Lammert and 
Hovemann (2012), Franck (2014), Peeters and Szymanski (2014), Preuss, Haugen and 
Schubert (2014) and Szymanski (2014). 
 
But has competitive balance in European football actually decreased in recent times? 
Michie and Oughton (2004) suggested a decrease in competitive balance in the main 
football leagues in England, Italy and Germany in the recent decade, while on the other 
hand, others such as Goossens (2006) or Gasparetto and Barajas (2016) did not find a 
general increase in inequality between teams in the major European football leagues. Part 
of the explanation for the lack of consensus is probably the different ways in which the 
academic literature has estimated competitive balance. The Analysis of Competitive 
Balance (ACB) line of literature has focused on how competitive balance changes over 
time, measured as the total differences between teams in a given season, and has been 
defended by authors such as Fort and Maxcy (2003) as a reliable measurement. 
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However, analysing global changes in inequality between teams does not explain why the 
changes took place or propose measures that should be taken to reverse them if they are 
considered negative. For example, the total competitive balance could decrease because the 
front runners improve, because the underdogs’ performance worsens, because both things 
happen at the same time or simply because changes take place in the middle of the 
distribution not affecting the tails. Analyses of different competitions in which the absolute 
levels of competitive balance are compared do not tell us much about the reasons behind 
the changes and whether or not they are similar among leagues. In fact, following the same 
line of reasoning, recent studies in economic inequality have highlighted the importance of 
going beyond an analysis of total inequality, decomposing its changes and effects between 
groups. For instance, van der Weide and Milanovic (2014) showed different dynamics in 
inequality and its effects on income if the sample of individuals analyzed is divided, 
showing that increasing inequality within the poorest 40 per cent was negative for the 
incomes of the poor, but good for the incomes of the rich. We therefore believe that 
competitive balance should be calculated not just as a global measure, but should also be 
decomposed to better understand the different dynamics of the changes over time that 
could be hidden by a global average. This approach is key for policy making 
recommendations to reverse undesirable outcomes. 
 
In addition to the previous concerns about absolute measurements, authors such as 
Zimbalist (2002) have concluded that the key issue when choosing the right measurement 
of competitive balance is its ability to capture whether a lack of competition could have an 
effect on the interest of the fans. This line of literature is known as the uncertainty of 
outcome hypothesis (UOH).  Zimbalist concluded that we cannot apply the same 
methodology for measuring competitive balance to all sports or competitions, as it heavily 
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depends on factors such as the way they are organized. He argued that in competitions like 
the major European football leagues, which are based on relegation systems, high 
inequality between teams may not be negative and could even be tolerated by smaller 
teams if they feel that the results are fair (Zimbalist, 2002: 119). Nalbantis, Pawlowski and 
Coates (2015) for instance suggested that the fans that view a football game as more 
suspenseful are also more willing to pay higher prices. If that is the case, then the study of 
the total inequality between teams may not be the best approach to estimate competitive 
balance. A key point to define here is what the smaller teams would understand as “fair” 
competition.  
 
This paper will try to shed some light on the issues presented above. The first part of the 
paper will present the methodology and data used to estimate competitive balance in 
European football, taking into account both the ACB and UOH literature. We will do so by 
explaining how the decomposition of competitive balance and the analysis of the chances 
of weak teams to succeed can help us to identify the leagues that are more competitive. 
The second section of the paper will study the evolution of competitive balance in the four 
major European football leagues, the Spanish “La Liga”, the English “Premier League”, 
the German “Bundesliga” and the Italian “Serie A”, between 1975 and 2016. In addition to 
analyzing the long-term changes in inequality levels, we will also identify the reasons 
behind the changes and the differences between leagues by decomposing the inequality 
levels using the statistical properties of the generalized entropy indexes.  
 
 In an attempt to measure the possibility of success that incumbent teams have in each 
competition, we will estimate the probabilities that promoted teams had to be relegated in 
each one of the leagues using binary statistical models. In our opinion, combined with the 
study of the decomposition of the traditional competitiveness measurements, this 
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methodology will allow us to obtain a better idea of the evolution of competitive balance in 
European football over the last decades. The following section of the paper will discuss the 
results and try to offer an explanation of the different trends observed in the major 
European football leagues, and the final section will conclude. 
 
 
Sources and Methodology 
 
 
We first decided to measure competitive balance by estimating the inequality levels within 
the leagues, following the same empirical strategy used for its estimation in the economic 
literature and related to the ACB literature. Therefore, we decided to measure competitive 
balance by analyzing the dispersion of the percentage of points achieved by each team in 
each season and comparing them over time. For that purpose, we gathered information on 
the final classifications for all the seasons between 1975 and 2016 in the Spanish, English, 
German and Italian football leagues. Given that the number of teams in the different 
leagues and years changed, we standardized the classifications by dividing the points 
obtained by each team by the average for that season. This has been a common approach in 
the literature as Szymanski and Kuypers (1999), Goosens (2006) or Curran, Jennings and 
Sedgwick (2009) show. 
 
As Owen, Ryan and Weatherston (2007) explained, we should take into account that the 
number of teams in a competition could have an effect on the estimation of competitive 
balance. However, in our case, the differences between the four leagues are small, with the 
number of teams always approximately twenty, with the only exception being the second 
half of the seventies, when the numbers were slightly lower in Italy.  
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To estimate the inequality levels, we relied on traditional measurements like the Gini 
coefficient. Although we also present information about the analysis of the percentiles, the 
Gini coefficient allows us to take into account the whole distribution, while percentile 
measures tend to omit the analysis of the values in the middle. Equation 1 shows the 
specification of the Gini coefficient that we used in the paper. 
 
ܩ ൌ 1 െ		෍ሺܺ௞ାଵ െ ܺ௞ሻ
௡ିଵ
௄ୀଵ
ሺ ௞ܻାଵ െ ௞ܻሻ 
 
(1) 
 
where ௞ܻrepresents the cumulative proportion of the points, ܺ௞ the cumulative proportion 
of the number of teams and n the total number of teams each year.  
 
However, although the Gini coefficient offers us a good proxy to study the evolution of 
total inequality over the long term, the global results could be influenced by movements in 
different parts of the distribution that do not have to be common to all the competitions. 
For that reason, we also study the changes in the distribution by analyzing the probability 
density functions using Kernel estimations. We complete the study with the use of 
generalized entropy indexes to analyze the dynamics behind the changes and to study the 
results in different groups of teams that could have different objectives. Although authors 
like Peel and Thomas (1992), Buraimo and Simmons (2008) and Czarnitzki and Stadtmann 
(2002) used the Theil index to measure competitive balance, they did not take advantage of 
the possibilities of decomposing it.  Among the different possible specifications of the 
Theil index, we decided to use the Theil’s L index, which is the most common in the 
literature (Mora-Sitja, 2006). Equation 2 shows the specification of the Theil’s L index that 
uses the mean log deviation. 
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ܫ௢ ൌ 1ܰ෍݈݊ ൬
ݕത
ݕ௜൰
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
 
 
(2)
 
where N is the total number of teams each year, ݕ௜ is the number of points of each team 
and ݕത is the average number of points.  
 
As previously explained, one of the advantages of the generalized entropy indexes is the 
possibility of decomposing them. In our case, we divided the sample of teams in each 
league and season depending on the position that they occupied in the final classification. 
Although we used different specifications, in the paper, we present the results using three 
groups: those teams in the first quartile, those in the second, and finally, a third group 
including the teams in the third and fourth quartiles.1  We will therefore be able to study 
not only the changes in total inequality, but also the changes between and within each one 
of the groups, which could help us to understand if teams with different goals are able to 
compete against their peers within their “own leagues”. The Theil index can then be 
decomposed into within- and between-group inequality. Within-group inequality calculates 
the inequality within the three groups described above, while between-group inequality 
estimates inequality between the groups. In other words, total inequality could increase 
because the distance between the teams in one group increases with respect to the other 
groups (between) or because the differences between the teams within one specific group 
increase (within). Equation 3 shows the estimation of the Theil index decomposed.  
  
ܫ଴ ൌ 	෍ቀ݊௞ܰ ቁ ܫ଴
௞
௡
௞ୀଵ
൅ ෍݊௞ܰ ݈݊ ቌ
݊௞
ܰݕ௞ݕത
ቍ
௡
௞ୀଵ
 
 
(3)
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where 
ܫ଴௞ ൌ 1ܰ ෍ln ቆ
̅ݕ
ݕ݅
ቇ
ܰ
݅ൌ1
 
 
 (4)
 
The first term shows the estimation of within-group inequality and calculates the inequality 
within each one of the groups that we defined. It is calculated as the weighted average of 
the Theil Indexes within each group (ܫ଴௞ሻ estimated following the proper adaptation of 
equation 2. The second term, on the other hand, estimates between-group inequality.  
 
As previously explained, the dominance of stronger teams may not have a negative impact 
on the interest of the fans (focus of the UOH literature) as long as the competition is seen 
as a fair one. 2  But what makes a competition fair? We believe that the key is making sure 
that all the teams have a reasonable chance of achieving their main goals, taking into 
account that they are not the same. While the objective of the most powerful teams could 
be winning the competition, the purpose for most of the teams may simply consist of not 
being relegated. After analyzing the evolution of competitive balance and its sources, we 
decided to further develop Zimbalist’s argument on the fairness of a competition by taking 
a Rawlsian approach, studying the chance that the incumbent teams have to accomplish 
their goals. Buraimo and Simmons (2008) suggested that fans in the Premier League did 
not want the matches of their team to be more equal, but to be won. In the same way, the 
incumbent teams will not care much about whether the league is globally more or less 
equal, as their chances of winning it are rather small, but about surviving in the major 
league and not being relegated.  
 
For that reason, we decided to estimate how hard it was for promoted teams to maintain 
their position avoiding being relegated, in an attempt to measure the most important issue 
for the fans of a large number of teams, and at the same time, the chances to compete of 
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the weakest teams. Our approach to measure the chances of the weakest teams in the 
competition will be the estimation of upper mobility of teams from the lower league.  The 
organization of the major football leagues in Europe is based on a system where a number 
of teams are relegated and substituted by teams promoted from the lower league.  
Following principles of industrial economics, every season the football market in the major 
league suffers the arrival of new incumbents who fight with the established teams in order 
to survive. The ability of the incumbents to compete and the capacity of established firms 
to impose entry barriers is a well-studied issue in industrial economics since the seminal 
work by Caves & Porter (1977), and in the case of the major football leagues would also 
determine the outcome of the relegation system. If established teams are able to exert a 
dominant position, incumbents will not be able to compete, will suffer relegation, and the 
market will be characterized by a low mobility. 
 
Although there could be some exceptions, in general, the average position of recently 
promoted teams is weaker than that enjoyed by established teams in the major league. 
First, on average, recently promoted teams arrive to the new competition in a weaker 
economic position, given that they still have not benefited from the income derived from 
their new status. Secondly, they are also penalized when they have to hire, as teams with a 
long record of permanence are more attractive to players and also have more time to 
negotiate with the security of remaining in the top league, while many of the teams that 
will promote are still competing in the lower leagues in order to do so. Finally, there are 
also unobservable variables that cannot be measured, but that can be proxied by the status 
of recently promoted, for instance, influence in the media, sport institutions, etc. that 
require a long and sustained permanence in the top league in order to be consolidated. The 
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intensity of these advantages that established teams enjoy over incumbents will determine 
the level of entry barriers and the mobility of the market. 3 
 
We decided to study all the seasons of the 2010s, as they are the ones that we identified as 
the years of the great divergence in European football between the strong and weak teams 
and when we should observe more clearly the existence of entry barriers. Because the 
variable that we are trying to explain is binary (relegated or not), we used binary 
econometric estimations such as the probit and logit models for our specification strategy. 
Equation 4 defines the probit model, where we estimate the probability of being relegated 
(Y=1) when the team has been promoted that same year (X=1). The model estimates the 
parameter β using a normal distribution of errors as shown in equation 5. 
 
							Prሺܻ ൌ 1ള ݔሻ ൌ ߶ሺݔߚሻ (5) 
 
 
Apart from the coefficients estimated by both models, which give us information about 
whether the independent variables affect the dependent variable, we also calculated the 
marginal effects in order to estimate the changes in the probability of being relegated when 
the team had been recently promoted. Because the independent variable is also binary 
(promoted or not), the interpretation of the marginal effects will show us the increase in the 
probability of being relegated if the team has been promoted that year and an estimation of 
the entry barriers faced by promoted teams. 
 
 
Results 
 
 
The Evolution of Competitive Balance 1975-2016 
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High inequality in a football league reveals a lack of competitiveness and also, as 
explained above, a more hostile environment for smaller teams. Figure 1 shows the 
evolution of inequality measured by the Gini coefficient in the share of points within the 
four major European football leagues between 1975 and 2015. The results show that the 
Spanish league has always been the most egalitarian competition, while the Italian Series A 
has maintained inequality levels that are considerably higher than any of the other three 
competitions during the whole period. The German and English leagues remained in the 
middle, although while the Bundesliga was more unequal during the first years, the 
Premier League increased in inequality very rapidly to become the most unequal 
competition at the turn of the century. We also observe a common increase in inequality in 
Spain, Germany and England which took place beginning around 1995, and quickly 
converged and even surpassed the high levels already present in Italy by 2005.  
 
		
Figure	1.	Gini	coefficient	in	the	four	major	European	leagues,	1975‐2015	(7	years	moving	
average);	own	estimations.	
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We can therefore identify a period of lower inequality between 1975 and 1995 and a period 
of high inequality between 2005 and 2015 in the case of Spain, England and Germany, 
while in the case of Italy, inequality was high during the whole period, with the lowest 
values reached between 1975 and 1985. Table 1 shows a summary of the indicators of 
competitive balance between the period of low inequality (1975-1985) and the period of 
high inequality (2005-2015). The Gini coefficient shows the average Gini for the period in 
each league. Average points front estimates the ratio between the average points achieved 
by the teams that occupied the first four positions and the average. Average points back 
shows the same calculation, but for the teams that occupied the last four positions. Finally, 
we also show the ratio between both. 
 
Table 1. Gini coefficient and front/back ratios in the four major European leagues, 1975-
2015 (7 years moving average); own estimations. 
 
 Spain England 
 1975-85 2005-15 1975-85 2005-15 
Gini coefficient 0.12 0.16 0.13 0.18 
Average points front 1.30 1.50 1.35 1.51 
Average points back 0.73 0.68 0.69 0.62 
Ratio front/back 1.79 2.22 1.95 2.43 
     
 Germany Italy 
 1975-85 2005-15 1975-85 2005-15 
Gini coefficient 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.17 
Average points front 1.36 1.45 1.37 1.46 
Average points back 0.68 0.66 0.69 0.65 
Ratio front/back 1.99 2.19 2.00 2.23 
 
 
 
Competitive balance was higher in the Spanish league during the period of low inequality, 
being only lower than Germany by a small margin during the period of high inequality. 
The other major leagues show relatively similar levels of competitive balance in the period 
of low inequality, while in England, the levels increased rapidly to become the most 
unequal competition in the 2010s. We also observe that the Spanish league was the one in 
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which the average points obtained by the bottom part of the distribution are higher in both 
periods, four percentage points higher than England and Italy c.1970 and six points higher 
c.2010.  
 
Figure 2 presents the Kernel density distributions in both periods, also revealing interesting 
results. In the case of Spain, the distribution shows a shift to the left of the whole 
distribution that is compensated by the appearance of some teams in the upper part. The 
dynamics in the English Premier League were different, where the distribution tends to 
become more bimodal, with a large number of teams around the lower middle part, but 
also an increasing percentage of teams joining the upper part. The German league reduced 
the number of teams in the upper middle part of the distribution, increasing the share of 
teams in the lower middle part, while in the case of Italy, the distribution was practically 
the same.   
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Figure	2.	Kernel	curves.	Solid	lines	show	the	distribution	in	the	2010s,	and	dashed	lines	present	the	distribution	
in	the	1970s;	own	estimations.	
	
Analyzing the Internal Dynamics of Inequality 
 
 
As explained above, the decomposition of competitive balance can reveal significant 
differences between the four leagues. Changes in inequality can take place for many 
different reasons. The Theil index allows us not only to measure inequality, but also to 
decompose the changes observed. We divided the teams in each competition into three 
groups: those that at the end of the season occupied the top quartile in each classification 
(top), those that occupied the second quartile (medium) and those that occupied the lowest 
half (bottom). 4  
 
Figure 3 shows the changes in the Theil index between the period of low inequality (1975-
1985) and the period of high inequality (2005-2015) and how much was a consequence of 
within- and between-group inequality. As in the case of the Gini coefficient, we observe 
that Spain was the most egalitarian competition in the first period and that although 
inequality increased rapidly, it remained comparatively low, just slightly higher than in 
Germany, which currently appears to be the most equal league.  
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Figure	3.	Theil	index	decomposition	for	the	four	major	European	football	leagues;	own	
estimations;	own	estimations.	
 
The results show that most of the increase in inequality in all the leagues was a 
consequence of an increase of between-group inequality, while within-group inequality 
also increased, but did it so more slowly. Therefore, the competitions became more 
unequal because those teams at the top increased their distance from their followers. There 
are, however, differences between the four leagues. The increase in inequality was more 
intense in England, where it grew by 79 per cent, with between-group inequality 
representing 90 per cent of the rise. Spain presents the second highest increase of 74 per 
cent, with between-group inequality representing 95 per cent of the growth. The German 
league increased in inequality by only 25 per cent, and most of it (98 per cent) was a 
consequence of an increase in between-group inequality. Finally, from an already high 
starting point, Italy presents the smallest increase of 12 per cent, in which within-group 
inequality actually decreased by 37 per cent, partially compensating for the growth of 
between-group inequality.  
 
But, what are the internal dynamics within the different groups? Figure 4 shows the 
changes in inequality within the top quartile in both periods. Once again, we can observe 
significant differences between the four competitions. The Spanish league shows an 
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exponential increase of 200 per cent, while the increases in the other leagues were more 
modest.  
	
Figure	4.	Changes	in	inequality	within	the	first	quartile;	own	estimations.	
 
 
 
As Figure 5 shows, inequality within the second quartile also increased in the case of Spain 
and England, although in this case, it did so more quickly in the Premier League. Germany 
and Italy, on the other hand, experienced a small decrease in inequality in the second 
quartile, in which the competition became slightly more egalitarian. 
		
Figure	5.	Changes	in	inequality	within	the	second	quartile;	own	estimations.	
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Finally, Figure 6 presents the changes in inequality within the lowest two quartiles of the 
classification. The results show a ten per cent increase in the Premier League, with the 
lowest part of the distribution becoming the most unequal. Italy and Germany presented 
reductions (18 and 8 per cent, respectively), showing that the competition among the 
lowest half of the classification became more egalitarian, although in the case of Italy, 
from a high starting point. Spain, on the other hand, presented the most competitive league 
in the bottom half and also showed the most intense reduction between both periods (25 
per cent), becoming even more egalitarian.  
 
	
Figure	6.	Changes	in	inequality	within	the	bottom	half;	own	estimations.	
 
 
We can therefore conclude that although inequality increased in all the competitions, it did 
not do so at the same levels and also that the internal dynamics behind the changes were 
very different. The Premier League became more unequal within all the groups, a dynamic 
that reinforced the increase in between-group inequality and explains why it increased to 
become the most unequal major league in Europe. Italy started from already high 
inequality levels that increased mainly as a consequence of increases in between-group 
inequality, while within-group inequality decreased, mainly as a consequence of the 
competition becoming more egalitarian within the lowest quartiles. The rise of inequality 
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in Germany was mainly a result of rising between-group inequality, which was reinforced 
by a rise in inequality in the top quartile. Finally, Spain appears to be a very particular 
case, where increasing total inequality derived from rising between-group inequality was 
mostly explained by rising within-group inequality in the top quartile, while on the other 
hand, the competition became more egalitarian in the lowest quartiles, in which the 
inequality levels remained considerably lower than in any other major league.   
 
 
 
 
Examining the Intensity of Entry Barriers 
 
 
After analyzing the changes in total inequality and the internal dynamics that explain them, 
we observed that the Spanish league was the most egalitarian in the lowest part of the 
distribution and also the competition where, as presented in Table 2, the teams in the 
lowest quartile were able to achieve more points at the end of the year. However, the most 
important goal for those teams in the lowest part of the classification table is not 
maximizing the total number of points that they obtain, but obtaining enough to remain in 
the league and not being relegated. For that reason, we decided to study the chance that 
promoted teams had to be relegated in each one of the leagues as an estimation of the 
mobility in the football market. 
 
As explained before, we used a binary econometric model in which the dependent variable 
will be being relegated, while the independent variable will take into account whether the 
team has been promoted that same year. As robustness checks, we used both probit and 
logit models. We also considered that a team that was recently promoted could be 
relegated, not that very same year, but the following season. For that reason, we repeated 
the exercise, also including in our independent variable the teams that had been promoted 
20 
 
the previous season to allow a one year lag between promotion and relegation. Model 1 
shows the probit estimation using only the teams promoted in the same season, and Model 
2 the same specification, but with a logit approach. Model 3 presents the results for the 
probit estimation, also including the teams promoted the previous season, and Model 4 the 
logit estimation. We present the beta coefficients estimated by the model, the marginal 
effects and their correspondent standard errors. In order to obtain enough statistical 
variance, we included information for all the seasons between 2010 and 2016, which were 
also the years when inequality in the four leagues reached its peak and when we expected 
the promoted teams to be in a more weakened position. 
 
Table 2. Estimation of entry barriers in the four major European football leagues. 2010-
2016. Probit and logit estimations.  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Beta ME Beta ME Beta ME Beta ME 
Spain 0.32 
(0.36) 
0.08 
(0.41) 
0.58 
(0.36) 
0.08 
(0.41) 
0.27 
(0.38) 
0.07 
(0.41) 
0.48 
(0.38) 
0.07 
(0.41) 
England 0.66* 
(0.07) 
0.19* 
(0.08) 
1.15** 
(0.06) 
0.19 
(0.12) 
0.63** 
(0.04) 
0.16* 
(0.06) 
1.13** 
(0.03) 
0.17* 
(0.06) 
Germany 0.88** 
(0.01) 
0.27** 
(0.03) 
1.51*** 
(0.00) 
0.26** 
(0.03) 
0.58* 
(0.06) 
0.16* 
(0.08) 
1.03* 
(0.06) 
0.16* 
(0.08) 
Italy 1.02*** 
(0.00) 
0.30** 
(0.01) 
1.77*** 
(0.00) 
0.30** 
(0.01) 
1.08*** 
(0.00) 
0.29*** 
(0.00) 
1.93*** 
(0.00) 
0.29*** 
(0.00) 
  
a Dependent variable: relegated= 1, not-relegated=0.  Independent variable: promoted=1, established=0 
b Standard errors are robust.  
c Likelihood ratio chi-square shows that models are significant for all the cases except Spain, and therefore, 
that they fit significantly better than a model with no predictors. 
d * significant at 90 per cent ** significant at 95 per cent *** significant at 99 per cent. 
 
The results show that Spain was the only country where being a recently promoted team 
does not have any impact on the probability of being relegated for any of the 
specifications. In all the other leagues, having been recently promoted increases the 
probability of being relegated. In the case of England, depending on the specification used, 
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the marginal effects show that being recently promoted increased the probability of being 
relegated by between 16 and 19 per cent. In the German league, the probability increases to 
a range between 16 and 27 per cent. Finally, Italy is the country where promoted teams 
have worse prospects, as the probability that they have of being relegated increases by 
around 30 per cent compared to the rest of the competitors. 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
 
Our results show that a considerable decrease in the total competitive balance took place in 
the major European football leagues at the turn of the century. However, although the level 
of total inequality between the teams in the four leagues is similar today, a detailed 
analysis of its sources shows significant differences. First, the reasons behind the changes 
are not the same in all the leagues. In Spain, a small increase of teams in the upper tail 
switched the rest of the distribution to the left, without experiencing other significant 
changes. In England, the results were similar, but more accentuated, with a larger number 
of teams moving forward in the upper tail. The most significant change in the distribution 
in Germany was a decrease in the number of teams in the upper-middle part that engrossed 
the lower-middle, while the Italian league shows very small changes, as the initial 
inequality levels were already high. 
 
The decomposition of the changes by groups is also enlightening. When we compare the 
four competitions and the changes between the 1970s and the 2010s, we observe that 
inequality within the three groups is relatively similar in the four leagues with the only 
exception being Spain. In the Spanish case, inequality within the first quartile in the 2010s 
is significantly higher than in the other three leagues, while it is considerably lower within 
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the bottom half. The high inequality that La Liga presents in the first quartile is a 
consequence of the large difference in points between the two Spanish giants, Real Madrid 
and Barcelona, and the rest of the teams. This, however, does not mean that their 
dominance of the competition was higher than their counterparts in the other leagues, as 
Table 3 shows. Both in c.1970 and c.2010, the dominance of the two most successful 
teams in Spain was at similar levels (if not lower) as in England, Germany and Italy.  
 
Table 3. Number of titles obtained by the two top teams. 
 
1975-1985 (11 seasons) 
SPAIN ENGLAND GERMANY ITALY 
R. MADRID 5 LIVERPOOL 8 B. MUNICH 4 JUVENTUS 6 
AT. BILBAO 1 EVERTON 1 HAMBURG 3 TORINO 1 
Total 6  
54% 
Total 9 
81% 
Total 7 
63% 
Total 7 
63% 
 
2005-1015 (11 seasons) 
SPAIN  ENGLAND  GERMANY  ITALY  
BARCELONA 7 M. UNITED 7 B.MUNICH 7 JUVENTUS 5 
R. MADRID 3 CHELSEA 3 B. 
DORTMUND 
2 INTER 5 
Total 10 
91% 
Total 10 
91% 
Total 9 
81% 
Total 10 
91% 
 
 
 
The increase of total inequality in Spain which was a consequence of the rise within the 
first quartile was partially compensated by the decrease that took place within the bottom 
half. The differences between the teams in the lower part of the distribution were 
significantly lower in Spain than in the other three leagues. Table 1 actually shows how the 
teams that occupied the last four positions in La Liga obtained better results than their 
European counterparts. These results are supported by the fact that the Spanish league was 
the only competition in which recently promoted teams did not have a higher probability of 
relegation. Consequently, if we use the possibilities that they have to compete within their 
“own league” and the chances of maintaining their status in the major league after being 
promoted (upper mobility) as a proxy for successfully accomplishing their goals, we could 
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conclude that the Spanish league provides better opportunities to smaller teams than the 
other three competitions, followed by Germany, England and Italy.  
 
On the other hand, it is still not clear if this situation is desirable in the long term, as 
smaller teams would have to accept the fact that they will never be able to compete for 
goals higher than their mere survival. Improving revenue sharing could be seen as a 
possible solution, although competitions like the Premier League, in which the budget 
differences between teams are smaller than in competitions like La Liga, do not present 
more diversification in the number of teams winning the competition. It is also not clear 
that it creates more competitive teams. Figure 7 shows that there are no signs of Spanish 
teams in recent years being less successful internationally than their English competitors 
where revenue sharing is more equal. Real Madrid and Barcelona clearly dominated 
European football, conquering more than half of all the Champion Leagues since 2005. 
However, the success of Spanish football was also transmitted to smaller teams like 
Atletico de Madrid or Villarreal, which reached several finals and semi-finals. If we 
analyze the results in the Europe League for the competitions in which weaker teams 
participated, the results for Spanish football are even better, obtaining 7 out of 11 
championships and representing more than 30 per cent of all the participants in the 
semifinals, way ahead of the rest of the major leagues, although they suffered a 
considerable handicap in terms of economic strength, particularly face-to-face with their 
English counterparts. 5 The results for the participants in La Liga are even better if we take 
into account only the most recent years, showing that the trend, far from being reversed, is 
intensified.    
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Figure	7.	Winners	and	teams	reaching	the	semifinals	in	the	Champions	League	and	the	
Europe	League,	2005‐2016	(11	seasons);	own	estimations.	
 
 
The international dominance of Spanish clubs in recent years is also more diversified than 
in the rest of the leagues. Five different Spanish teams reached the semifinals of the 
Champions League, compared to three in Germany and Italy, with only England showing a 
slightly higher number, with six clubs. If we study the Europe League, where the revenue 
differences between the Spanish clubs and the rest are higher, the results are more striking, 
with seven different Spanish clubs reaching the semifinals, compared to four in England 
and Germany and three in Italy. The fact that revenue sharing in La Liga was more unequal 
than in England and that average revenues for teams other than Real Madrid and Barcelona 
were considerably lower was not translated into a league in which the rest of the teams 
were not competitive internationally.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Measuring competitive balance in sports is a hard issue that has to take into account both the 
study of the total differences between teams, as well as other factors, such as the 
idiosyncrasies of each sport and competition. We therefore believe that there should be room 
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for the advocates of the ACB and UOH lines of literature, as the combined analysis of both 
provides the best explanatory power. This paper has shown how although inequality within 
the four major European leagues has increased during the last decades to reach similar levels, 
the dynamics behind the changes are very different. While in Spain and England, the 
divergence between the upper tail and the rest of the distribution is to blame for the reduction 
in competitive balance experienced recently, in Germany, it is responsible for the relative 
“impoverishment” of teams in the middle part of the distribution. Our analysis of the entry 
barriers show that incumbent teams have a better chance to succeed in the Spanish league than 
in the rest. This is a consequence of lower inequality within the bottom half of the distribution 
in La Liga, which also improves the chances for recently promoted teams to maintain their 
recently acquired status, at the same time, sending a promising signal to the teams competing 
in the lower leagues.  
 
The success of Spanish teams in international competitions is surprising, given their economic 
weakness compared to some of their European competitors. A possible explanation could be 
the fact that La Liga is a competition that is more equal, not only in the bottom half of the 
distribution, but also, as can be seen in the kernel distributions, in practically every other 
decile. A more intense competition in the national league could therefore produce teams that 
are also more competitive abroad, and lower entry barriers would increase competition and 
improve efficiency. If this is the case, then the best way to guarantee international success is 
to ensure a high level of mobility that would encourage competition. We believe that this 
interesting hypothesis could open a new line of investigation, which would, however, require 
further and more detailed research.  
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Notes 
 
1. We do not observe significant changes when we vary the number of groups. 
2.  Zimbalist showed how the supremacy of Manchester United in the Premier League in 
the 1990s coincided with growth in the popularity of the sport. 
3. On average, the relative market value of promoted compared to established teams is 
72% lower in Spain, 67% lower in England and 65% lower in Germany and Italy. 
Information retrieved from www.transfermarkt.com. 
4. As a robustness check, we also repeated the estimations using different specifications, 
such as dividing the teams in four quartiles. The results were robust with those 
presented in the paper and are not included for reasons of space. 
5.  Out of the 30 European teams with higher revenues, during the 2010s, there were, on 
average, 12 English teams, 5 German, 5 Italian and 4 Spanish (Deloitte Football Money 
League, 2012-2017). 
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